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In 1789 the fledgling nation of the United States of America unanimously elected 
its first president, a war hero named George Washington. In accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution, Washington served a four-year term, at the completion of 
which he ran again for president. He won, and after four more years, was succeeded by 
his vice-president, John Adams, who defeated Thomas Jefferson to become the second 
president of the United States of America. Four years later Jefferson would tum the tables 
on his victor and defeat Adams to become the nation's third president. 
For over two hundred years a cycle of presidential elections, re-elections, defeats, 
and deaths has continued, with forty-one men claiming at different times the title of 
President of the United States of America. Some of the greatest leaders in modem history 
have carried this title, men such as Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. These 
men have left their names and deeds indelibly etched into the annals of history, and the 
American people owe much to their accomplishments. 
Though the Washingtons and the Jeffersons of American history usually come to 
mind at the mention of the word "president", men with names such as Fillmore, Pierce, 
Hayes, and Hoover also hold an equal right to share the same distinction. How come 
then, are they forgotten when the average American invokes thoughts of the presidency? 
Perhaps the James K. Polks and the Millard Fillmores of the past have been 
forgotten because they were one-term presidents. Of the forty-one US presidents, over 
half (23), have served only one term. Of these twenty-three one-term presidents, very few 
occupy a prominent position in the collective lexicon of the American people. If a one­
term president is well known by the American public the reason usually lies in the 
recentness of their presidency (Ford, Carter, and Bush) or the fantastic events 
surrounding their death (Kennedy). 
Perhaps the American public simply due to the shorter duration of their 
presidency forgets one-term presidents. After all, serving four years rather than eight 
leaves just half the time to accomplish policy, shape national and global events, and to 
leave one's mark on history. Given the opportunity for four more years of the highest 
office in the land, how may the occurrence of the one-term president be explained? 
One explanation for occurrence of the one-term president is quite simple. Six of 
the one-term presidents died in office. Another answer can be found in the choice of the 
president not to run for re-election. Factors such as job stress, poor health, and 
unpopularity may have factored into the decision of four presidents (James K. Polk, 
James Buchanan, Grover Cleveland, and William Howard Taft) not to seek re-election. 
Even two-term presidents such as Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson with eligibility to 
run again opted to vacate the top post in favor of a quieter life. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, five presidents attempted to seek re-election, but were denied nomination by 
their party. 
Having identified the factors of death in office, unwillingness to run for re­
election, and refusal by party to nominate, there still remain nine one-term presidents 
whose length of tenure as president remains unexplained. The answer? These nine 
presidents served only one-term due to a loss to another candidate in a presidential 
election. Why did these presidents lose their bids for re-election? Were they poor leaders? 
Or did other factors play a role in their defeats? 
Instead of dissecting the failures of the one-term presidents, perhaps another 
approach may be used to explain why they were not re-elected. For various reasons, the 
American public did not deem re-election of the current president vital to the state of the 
country. So what factors make the re-election of the president a guarantee in the fickle 
favor of the voting public? By concentrating on the successful re-elections of the two­
term presidents and the factors surrounding their re-elections, an understanding may be 
gained of the factors necessary for presidential re-election. 
An investigation of the seventeen successful presidential incumbents, indicates 
that at least one of four re-occurring factors has been present in each successful re­
election bid. This paper will analyze the four factors present in the re-election attempts of 
the incumbent presidents in order to determine the impact each of the factors had on the 
re-election of the incumbent president. The paper will then offer an analysis of which 
factors are likely to influence future presidential elections. 
Of the eighteen successful incumbents four were re-elected as founding fathers 
and revolutionary patriots of the United States. Five presidents were re-elected while the 
United States was engaged in war. Five of the successful incumbents were publicly 
acknowledged war heroes from previous conflicts. The remainder of the successful 
incumbents were re-elected during times of relative economic prosperity. 
Founding Fathers and Re-election Bids 
The early American patriot presidents enjoyed a fair amount of success in their 
bids for a second term. George Washington, whose election in 1788 was a mere 
formality, triumphed easily again in 1792, with runner-up John Adams occupying the 
office of vice-president. After winning the presidency in 1800, Thomas Jefferson 
thoroughly buried his opponents Charles Coatesworth of South Carolina and Rufus King 
ofNew York in what amounted to an electoral landslide. Like Jefferson, James 
Madison's win in the election of 1812 over DeWitt Clinton occurred without major cause 
for concern on the part of the incumbent. 
During the first term of his presidency the name George Washington carried not 
only the highest level of recognition but also the highest level of any person in colonial 
America. As the hero of the Revolutionary War, Washington's exploits were legendary 
and his election as first president was the obvious choice of the young nation. During the 
first tumultuous years of the United States the role of the presidency carried with it a 
heavy burden for Washington. So great was the stress of the job that Washington sought 
to leave office at the completion of his first term. Only the cajoling of his ministers and a 
concern for the future of the young nation persuaded Washington to run for a second 
term. 1
Jefferson and Madison, two of the most respected names in politics of the time 
disagreed with several aspects of the Washington administration, the largest of which 
being Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamiltons' radical policies and his vast 
amount of influence on Washington's decisions. However, the two statesmen felt it 
essential for the well being of the young country for Washington to remain in office, so 
they joined the rest of Washington's ministers in clamoring for his retum.2 Once
1 Richard North Smith, Patriarch: George Washington and the New American Nation (New York. 1993), p.
133. 
2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., Running for President: The Candidates and their Images Vol. 1, (New York, 
1993), p. 8. 
Washington committed to the job the election was never in doubt, as the major political 
drama of 1792 was the possibility of Washington opting out of the presidency for the 
quieter setting of Mount Vernon. 
The next patriot to retain the White House was Thomas Jefferson, the'third 
president of the United States. The author of Constitution, Jefferson maintained a 
level of recognition and respect in the eyes of the American public equal to that of 
Washington. The election of 1804 proved a monumental landslide for Jefferson and his 
political party, the Democrats. The opposition Federalist party partially owed the defeat 
of its candidate, Rufus King, to the inability to find an appealing issue for which to fault 
Jefferson.3 Indeed, while Jefferson should receive credit for his efforts to maintain the 
strength of Democratic party uruty on a national level, his major contribution to the 
success ofhis party lie in himself as a national symbol.4 Like Washington, Jefferson's 
status as icon almost completely ensured that an attempt for re-election would be 
successful. 
Immediately following Jefferson, James Madison also succeeded in his bid for 
two terms. Both Madison and Washington are unique in this analysis of presidential re­
election bids in that they belong to two different categories. Along with the factor of 
wartime president improving his chances for re-election, Madison also played a large role 
as one of the founding fathers of the United States. Advisor to both Washington and 
Jefferson, Madison's contributions to shaping the government of the young nation were 
well known to the American voter. 
3 Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: First Tenn, 108/-1805 (Boston, 1970), p. 434. 
Ibid, p. 434. 
Almost as if he knew his status as founding father would guarantee victory, 
Madison's refusal to campaign offers a stark contrast to the vicious partisan tactics 
played by incumbent and challenger in modem presidential elections. Though DeWitt 
Clinton, Madison's opponent, campaigned savagely in an effort to win the office, 
Madison remained regally serene, and upon election day won by a handsome margin. 5
Three of the first four presidents were handily re-elected to second terms. The 
exception arises with John Adams, the second president of the United States. Just like 
Washington, Jefferson and Madison, Adams was a patriot and founding father of the 
United States, however, the American voters chose not to re-elect Adams in the election 
of 1800. One reason for this anomaly might stem from the fact that Adams' opponent in 
1800 was Thomas Jefferson, who was arguably a patriot of greater regard and esteem 
than Adams. Though the voting public had no major qualms with the Adams presidency, 
the possibility of Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, gaining 
the hlghest office in the land, seemed a more exciting prospect to Americans than four 
more years of Adams. This possibility looks even more probable considering the fact that 
Adams had the misfortune to follow George Washington, the greatest patriot in American 
history. Stuck between one half of the faces of Mount Rushmore, Adams election loss in 
1800 is quite understandable. 
Despite his loss, Adams should still be recognized as a founding father and a great 
patriot to the United States of America. His margin of defeat to Jefferson was not large, 
and the campaign was highly contested and close until the very end. One factor which 
severely hurt Adam's bid for re-election was the division between the Federalist party 
which split between Adam's followers, and those who believed that Alexander Hamilton 
� Robert Allen Rutland, The Presidency of James Madison (Kansas, 1998), p. 118. 
was the true brain behind the party.6 ln the same respect that Adams' defeat may be 
explained by the greater popularity of Thomas Jefferson. party infighting might have 
been the true reason for Adams loss in 1800. 
Though the factor of founding father/ patriot guaranteed re-election for three of 
the first four presidents, the influence this factor will play on future elections looks to be 
minimal. Trapped by the constraints of time and the human life span, the founding father 
re-election factor is limited to those men who participated in the founding of the United 
States. Even James Monroe, who followed Madison and succeeded in becoming a two­
term president does not qualify for this category due to his young age during the 
Revolutionary War. Although an accurate predictor of incumbent success during the early 
days of the country, the would-be founding father factor no longer affects the re-election 
of American Presidents. 
The Effect of War on a Presidential Election 
Since the election of Washington following the Revolutionary war, the United 
States bas been involved in six major wars or anned conflicts. Amidst four of these 
conflicts, a presidential election has occurred in which an incumbent candidate has been 
opposed by a challenger. In every instance, the incumbent emerged victorious and 
presided over a second tenn. The first conflict during which a presidential election did 
not occur was World War One. However, one year prior to the United States' entry into 
the war, President Woodrow Wilson won his bid for a second tenn of office. The second 
conflict that did not take place over the course of a presidential election was the Korean 
War. It is noteworthy to mention that these circumstances, similar to World War One, 
6 Schlesinger, Vol. 1, p. 36. 
resulted in incumbent Harry Truman's defeat over Thomas Dewey only a year prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities in winning a second rerm of office. 
As aforementioned, the election of 1812, held during the War of 1812, saw James 
Madison defeat DeWitt Clinton to gain re-election to a second term. As was the custom 
for presidents at the time Madison did not actively campaign for re-election. Throughout 
the course ofthe fall of 1812, Madison did not make one speech or shake one hand in 
search of supporters. Meanwhile, Clinton attacked Madison for not pursuing the war 
effort vigorously enough and for plunging an unprepared country into war. His efforts 
however were to no avail and Madison was re-elected by a large margin.7
Madison's apparent lack of interest in campaigning, which was expected from 
incumbents of the time, may have aided his chances for re-election. Madison remained 
silent while Clinton traversed both North and South, playing both sides depending on 
which part of the country he happened to be campaigning. This silence may have added 
to Madison's regal air, while Clinton may have muddied himself instead in his attempts 
to soil Madison.8
During the Civil War, the election of 1864 occurred, in which incumbent 
Abraham Lincoln defeated candidate and former United States General George B. 
McClellan. Lincoln, perhaps, represents both the best and the most intriguing example of 
the success of American presidential incumbents during times of war. The only president 
ever to be elected during a time of civil war, Lincoln's re-election was far from "a sure 
thing". Less than a month before the election Lincoln himself predicted McClellan would 
7 Rutland, pp. 117-118. 
8 Schlesinger, Vol. 1, p. 70. 
receive 114 electoral votes to his 117 electoral votes (the three electoral votes from 
Nevada were the difference), so unsure was the outcome of the election.9
While the Civil War had bitterly split north and south, the war had added another 
division by splitting the north into two factions, Lincoln's Republican Party and 
McClellan's Democrats (many of whom wished to end the war and forge a peace with the 
Confederacy). While the country as a whole was divided almost evenly between 
continuing the war and ending the conflict, the prospect of peace without victory appalled 
the Union army, especially the troops who had been fighting since the inception of the 
war. So strong was the Union soldiers' aversion to the prospect of peace that many 
soldiers wrote scathing attacks on McClellan and the Democrats, whose actions they 
deemed "traitorous". 10 The Union soldiers filled out their absentee ballots religiously for
Lincoln, doing everything in their power to ensure his re-election. 
Part of the Union anny's rationale for supporting Lincoln with such vehemence 
may have stemmed from a dislike of McClellan, their former commander. McClellan's 
reluctance to fight had angered the troops in the same manner that it had angered Lincoln, 
who eventually had McClellan removed from command. It is no secret that McClellan 
felt slighted and embarrassed by what he perceived to be unfair treatment from Lincoln, 
even before his removal from command.11 McClellan's decision to run against Lincoln
serves as the only time in history that a general has run for president against his fonner 
commander in chief. McClellan was so eager for the opportunity to avenge his earlier 
David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York, 1995), p. 543. 
10 John R. Brumgardt, "'Overwhelmingly for 'Old Abe": Sherman's Soldiers and the Election of 1864",
Lincoln Herald 78 ( 1976), pp. 153-159. 
11 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York, 1952), p. 131.
humiliation by Lincoln that he reversed his previous stance insisting on peace 
negotiations and claimed a desire to see the war to its conclusion.12
Perhaps the Union army's greatest contribution to Lincoln's victory occurred with 
the fall of Atlanta in September of 1864. This military victory provided Lincoln with the 
momentum his election campaign desperately needed. Though General Sherman and his 
soldiers secured the actual victory, Lincoln had ensured that the army would be capable 
of achieving such a victory. No president before Lincoln had so manipulated and 
expanded the power of the presidency in order to fulfill political and military goals. 
Lincoln's "emergency" assertions of power rapidly transformed the national army into a 
formidable force, one just strong enough to win him Atlanta, the victory he needed for re­
election. 13 While a war has guaranteed every incumbent to date an election victory, the 
Civil War might have proved the exception had a man other than Abraham Lincoln been 
president. 
While World War Two raged on, Franklin Delano Roosevelt defeated Thomas 
Dewey to win an unprecedented fourth tenn. The Roosevelt presidency represents one of 
the great anomalies in American politics. Roosevelt holds not only the title of three term 
president to himself, he also serves as the president and only member of the four-term 
presidents club. 
The presidential campaign of 1944 occurred during the largest conflict the world 
had ever seen, and Roosevelt, along with Stalin and Churchlll were in position to finish 
the war as unanimous victors. The United States had reached all-time zeniths of 
manufacturing power and global political influence, and Roosevelt was the man who had 
12 Phillip Shaw Paludan, The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (Kansas, 1994), p. 285. 
led the American people to these heights. Into this fray the Republican's nominated
DeweyJ governor of New York and a fonner New York City district attorney.
From the beginning Republican political leaders knew they were facing a difficult
task. Unlike most presidential elections certain issues were off limits due to the war. One
issue in particular, which remained off-limits during the campaign, concerned any
criticism of war policy. Any attempt by Dewey to criticize war leaders might look
unpatriotic. In the summer of 1944 an anti•Roosevelt officer in the anny leaked
infonnation stating that at the time of Pearl Harbor the United States had been cracking
Japanese codes. When U.S. Anny Chief of Staff George Marshall heard that Dewey was
considering releasing the code information in an effort to damage the Roosevelt 
campaign he sent a letter to Dewey underscoring the security importance of keeping the 
infonnation secret. Dewey was furious, but acquiesced. Though releasing the Pearl 
Harbor information may have cost Roosevelt thousands of votes, Dewey feared a 
possible backlash accusing him of hanning the war effort. 14
Dewey also contemplated using Roosevelt's poor health as a key issue to sway 
voters away from choosing the ai1ing president. Though the president was visibly ailing 
and the entire country knew it, Dewey feared that this line of attack might create 
sympathetic feelings toward the president. As if reading Dewey's mind, Roosevelt 
abandoned his reg1men of rest during the last month of the campaign and stumped with 
vigor. Ultimately Dewey chose not to pursue this avenue either. 15
13 James T. Patterson, "The Rise of Presidential Power Before World War II", Law and Contemporary
Problems 40 (Spring 1976), pp. 39-57. 
14 Martin V. Melosi, ''Political Tremors from a Military Disaster: 'Pearl Harbor' and the Election of 1944,'' 
Diplomatic History 1 (1977), pp. 79-95. 
15 Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York, 198S), p. 738. 
alternative to Nixon, whose rhetoric included finding "peace with honor" while 
authorizing bombing runs over Hanoi. 16
Not since the Civil War had the United States been as internally divided as they 
were regarding public opinion on the Vietnam War. In editorial columns across the nation 
the Vietnam War was debated. Some newspapers, such as the Washington Post and the 
New York Times clearly favored McGovern, while others such as the Chicago Tribune 
and the Los Angeles Times backed Nixon's bid for re-election. 17 Supporters of Nixon 
argued that McGovern's plans for peace would leave South Vietnam incapable of self­
defense and open to occupation by the North Vietnamese, while his detractors "reminded 
their readers that the President had promised four years ago to end the war but had failed 
to do s0. 1118 
Though the media played a role in manipulating the fortunes of both cha11enger 
and incumbent, Nixon realized that he could manipulate the media to control his own 
fortunes. Nixon knew of the growing unpopularity of American involvement in Vietnam 
and he skillfully used the media as a mouthpiece by which to convince the American 
public that the United States' presence in Southeast Asia was drawing rapidly to a close. 
On a campaign trip to New Hampshire Nixon stressed the corning end of the Vietnam 
War and along with it his administration's plans for a "generation ofpeace". 19 On the 
same trip Nixon publicly noted casualty differences between 1968 and 1972, which were 
down from over 300 a week to just over ten.20
16 Stephen Hess, "Does Foreign Policy Realty Matter?," Wilson Quarterly 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 96-111. 
11 David S. Myers, "Editorials and Foreign Affairs in the 1972 Presidential Campaign," Journalism
Quarterly 51 {Spring, 1974), pp. 251-257, 296. 
18 Ibid., p. 255. 
19 Edward W. Knappman, Joseph Fickes, Mary Elizabeth Clifford, Angelo LaCalandra, & Barry 
Youngennan, Presidential Election 1972 (New York, 1973), p. 25. 
20 Ibid., p. 25. 
Though the election of 1972 was by no means easy, Nixon still managed to defeat 
McGovern to win a second tenn of office. Indeed, Granberg and Seidel (1976) assert that 
McGovern's attempt at the presidency was doomed from the start. They believe that had 
McGovern taken a more moderate stance in his opposition to Vietnam, the outcome of 
the election might have differed. However, McGovern's rise from obscurity and his 
subsequent nomination occurred only due to his radical stance, without which his 
relatively low level of familiarity would have prevented any possibility of receiving a 
nomination. 21
In beating McGovern to gain a second term, Nixon remains the last of the 
presidents to attempt re-election during a war or armed conflict. That his re-election 
occurred despite the unpopularity of the Vietnam War indicates either a large amount of 
political savvy on the part of the Nixon campaign or a sign of the unwillingness of the 
American public to change leadership during the middle of a foreign crisis. Perhaps the 
idea of introducing a new leader to a volatile situation with the possibility of a negative 
outcome seems too frightening or unsure for Americans to consider. 
However, the American public is not alone in their actions, as the pattern of re­
electing incumbents during times of war illustrates a sociological phenomenon not 
limited to the United States. Throughout history when a nation clashes with foreign 
powers the people of the nation rally around their countries' leader, despite any previous 
grievances or complaints. One of the most famous examples of this occurrence is shown 
by the fantastic support given to Churchill by the British people during World War II. 
Upon the immediate completion of the war, however, the British Parliament called for an 
21 David Granberg & John Seidel, "Social Judgements of the Urban and Vietnam Issues in 1968 and 1972,"
Social Forces 55, (1976), pp. 1-15. 
election, in which Churchill lost soundly. As the war drew to a close and victory seemed 
assured, the British electorate looked increasingly toward issues such as demobilization 
and postwar reconstruction, and away from the war time leadership of Churchill. 
Churchill, sound in the belief that his Conservative party still held the goodwill of the 
English people due to his heroic leadership viewed the defeat as a great surprise. 22
A situation similar to that of Churchill occUJTed quite recently in the case of 
George Bush and the Persian Gulf War. During the Gulf War the American public's 
attention was drawn, in large part by the media, towards Bush's handling of the Gulf 
crisis and away from his handling of domestic policy issues. Since the American public 
viewed Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis much more positively than they evaluated his 
efforts in domestic issues, a sharp increase in Bush's popularity occurred.23 However, by
the time the election of 1992 had arrived the war had been won, the public had refocused 
their attention to Bush's domestic policy, and Bush was summarily defeated in the polls 
by challenger Bill Clinton. The successes of Madison, Lincoln, Wilson. Roosevelt, and 
Nixon seem to indicate that had the Gulf War occurred during the 1992 election 
campaign Bush would have defeated Clinton to gain a second term in the White House. 
The increase in Bush's popularity during the Gulf War occurred in large part 
because of the popularity of the Gulf War with the American people. The yellow ribbon 
phenomena, in which multitudes of Americans across religious, political, social, regional, 
economic, racial and age barriers affixed yellow ribbons to themselves, their trees, houses 
and cars, serves as a testament to America's support of the Gulf War and the troops 
22 Raymond A. Callahan, Churchill: Retreat from Empire (Wilmington, Delaware, 1984), pp. 237-239. 
23 Jon A. Krosnick and Laura A. Brannon, "The Media and the Foundations of Presidential Support: 
George Bush and the Persian Gulf Conflict,'' Journal of Social Issues 49 (Winter 1993), pp. 167-182. 
fighting the war. America's largest manufacturer of ribbon showed nearly a 1000 percent 
increase in sales the year of the war, an obvious sign of the popularity of the war.24 
Though the most recent, the Gulf War is not the only example of the American 
people unifying in their support of the government during a foreign crisis. Research has 
shown that throughout United States history, a "rally 'round the flag" effect which occurs 
when foreign policy crises arise.25 Though crises such as the OPEC embargo and the
taking of hostages in Iran will produce the rally 'round the flag effect, the effect will be 
strongest during times of war. 26 The yellow ribbon phenomenon provides a prime 
example for the increased strength of the rally 'round the flag effect during times of war. 
These examples illustrate the almost certain effect of the presence of an enemy to 
unify the people ofa nation. In America, Great Britain, Israel, even in Hitler's Nazi 
Germany people support their leaders if they perceive a common threat. One explanation 
for this phenomena can be found within the realms of sociological and psychological 
study. In 1988 psychiatrist Vamik Volkan hypothesized that humans have an innate need 
to identify another group as being "the enemy". Psychologically, this process helps the 
individual to create an identity for themselves and their group, an aspect essential to 
human development. On a sociological level, the existence of an enemy helps to create 
cultural identity and fosters group achievement. 27 Though the need for enemies often 
u Lotte Larsen, "The Yellow Ribboning of America: A Gulf War Phenomenon," Journal of American
Culture 17(Spring 1994),pp. 11-22.
25 John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," American Political Science Review 
64 ( 1970), pp. 18-34. 
26 John Oneal and Anna Lillian B.ryan, "The Rally 'Round the Flag Effect in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 
1950-1985," Political Behavior 17 (1995), 379-401. 
27 Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies & Allies: From Clinical Practice to International 
Relationships (Northvale, New Jersey, 1994), p. 3. 
produces negative consequences such as wars, Volkan insists that this condition plays a 
pennanent and unchangeable role in the human condition. 28 
Volkan's ideas, while they may seem radical, are supported by American and 
global voting behavior. Americans re-elect their presidents during times of war, 
regardless of any factors, even ones as important as the popularity of the war or the 
popularity of the president. One usually reliable indicator of election success is the ratio 
of federal spending to Gross National Product. In elections in which the ratio of federal 
spending to Gross National Product has increased, the public's reaction is usually 
negative for the incumbent president.29 Periods of major war serve as the only exception 
to this rule. During wars, the rally 'round the flag effect influences even financial matters. 
as voters believe that the extra spending is justified and the benefits will outweigh the 
costs. 
During times of war, an incumbent president seems almost immune to the dangers 
posed by the challenger. Increased spending does not seem to hurt his chances for re­
election. Nor will an unpopular war doom his fate, as the victories of Lincoln and Nixon 
illustrate. FDR proved that poor health will not stop the public from supporting an 
incumbent. Given the fact that these negative circumstances did not bring about a change 
in office, imagine the invulnerability of a popular president with sound health fighting a 
popular war. His re-election would seem almost a foregone conclusion. This scenario 
almost occurred with George Bush; however, fate conspired to end the Persian Gulf War 
a year before his re-election bid and by then the fickle American had grown tired of Bush 
and his attempt at a second term fell short. The American president is almost unassailable 
28 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
during a war, however, the war must be occurring for the president to have the full 
support of the American voter. 
The War Hero Factor in a Presidential Election 
Similar to the first two factors present in successful re-election attempts, the 
factor of war hero president combines the element of patriotism, a necessity in the first 
factor, and the element of war, a necessity in the second factor. For the purposes of this 
paper the war hero president will be defined as someone whose direct military 
involvement in a war, either in combat or from a strategic approach, had been general 
knowledge to the American public prior to their presidency. Having merely served in the 
army or navy does not confer upon a president war hero status for the purposes of this 
paper, rather the president must have exhibited either an act of personal heroism or the 
strategic involvement in a tactical victory to qualify for this factor. 
In terms of chronology and historical importance the first president considered for 
the war hero factor is undoubtedly George Washington. The general responsible for the 
American victory in the Revolutionary War, Washington qualifies for consideration due 
to his strategic contributions. However, Washington also qualifies for his personal 
heroism, which manifested itself in episodes such as the brutal Valley Forge winter of 
1776-1777 and his midnight crossing of the Delaware to surprise the British in Trenton. 
So revered was Washington as a national hero that not only his first term but also his 
second term as president were foregone conclusions by the public and the politicians of 
the time.30
29 Alfred, G. Cuzan & Charles M. Bundrick, "Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections, 1880-1992," Polity 
29 (Fall, 1996) pp. 141-157. 
30 Smith, p. 133. 
The post-war boom that ushered in the presidency of Coolidge was also in full 
swing for Harry Truman. Having seen the country to the completion of World War Two 
following the untimely death of FDR, Truman had watched over the roaring economic 
success that America experienced following the close of hostilities. In addition to the 
economic success Truman's presidency enjoyed, the world had entered into a new type of 
conflict with the onset of the Cold War. The happiness brought by economic success, 
coupled with the comfort of having a battle toughened president captain the country, gave 
many American voters no reason to want a change in leadership. Despite these factors, 
the public perception was such that Truman had no chance to win, so much so that 
Democrat leaders wanted to dump him for Eisenhower in the spring of 1948. 46 Ike, 
however, would not agree to run as a Democrat. The election of 1948 proved one of the 
closest in American history, so close that some newspapers prematurely heralded Thomas 
Dewey as victor and president-elect. Nonetheless, Truman achieved re-election, just as 
his predecessor FDR had done and his successor Eisenhower would do. 
Lyndon Baines Johnson, would, like Coolidge and Truman gain the presidency 
due to a death in office. The assassination of John F. Kennedy midway through his first 
term as president, ended the Camelot administration and placed Johnson in the White 
House. The America Johnson had inherited from Kennedy contained many positive 
aspects. Patriotism was still popular, in part a result of Kennedy's dramatic standoff with 
Khruschev during the Cuban missile crisis, and the economy was still flourishing, years 
away from the OPEC embargoes and automotive woes which characterized the seventies. 
The JFK mystique, which Johnson captured in part when he claimed to be fulfilling 
Schlesinger, Vol. 2, p. 239. 
JFK's legacy, greatly aided his fight against Republican candidate Barry Goldwater.47
Johnson's re-election in 1964, riding the twin skis of economic prosperity and the 
concept of the "Great Society" serves as a perfect example of the American public's 
willingness to stand behind a leader in times of a healthy economy. 
Just as the American public will stand behind a leader during good economic 
times, so will they abandon him during bad economic times. Such was the case in 1980, 
when the American public, tired of high unemployment, spiraling inflation, and Jimmy 
Carter's style of micro-management, voted Ronald Wilson Reagan into office as the 
fortieth president of the United States. Under the Republican Reagan administration the 
American economy began to recover, due in part to Reagan's hard line stance against the 
Soviet Union, which resulted in an anns race that poured billions in to the economy while 
at the same time sending the national debt into the trillions. 
Despite the rampant spending the American public liked its economic impact, and 
in 1984 their votes resulted in Reagan's landslide victory against Democratic candidate 
Walter Mondale, who had previously served as Carter's vice-president. Similar to 
election of 1972, the media played an especially large role in the election of 1984. On 
camera Reagan's acting skills helped portray him as a suave and charismatic leader, 
while at the same time the lens captured every bit of Mondale's beaked nose, sagging 
jowls and paunchy eyes.48
The most recent case of presidential re-election during economic prosperity 
occurred in 1996 when Democratic incumbent Bill Clinton defeated Republican hopeful 
Bob Dole. The Clinton administration, though rocked by personal scandals of both 
47 Schlesinger, Vol. 2, p. 311. 
41 Schlesinger, Vol. 2, p. 408. 
financial and sexual nature still held the favor of the American voter as Clinton won a 
second term in the White House.49 Once again, positive economic signs such as a 
spiraling stock market and low unemployment rates caused American voters to believe a 
change in leadership was not necessary.50 Ironically, Dole's status as war hero (he lost 
use of one ann during World War Two) could not win him the election as it had for many 
other presidents. 
Of the successful incumbents for whom economic prosperity is identified as a 
possible factor in achieving re-election, great variance exists between the presidents 
themselves. While Truman and Monroe are viewed from a scholarly viewpoint as 
successful presidents and good leaders, presidential scholars hold the presidency of 
Coolidge in a much lower regard. However, regardless of the competency of the 
president as an individual, they all share the common factor of election success during a 
time of economic prosperity. 
Having established the four factors by which successful re-election bids may be 
separated, what insights can be drawn regarding how the American public perceives its 
leaders? The factors of war and war hero status, two strong indicators of re-election 
success, illustrate the affinity of the American voter for heroic leaders. As mentioned 
earlier, Eisenhower typifies the heroic leader as president. Many of the qualities that 
combined to make Eisenhower a heroic leader were also present in George Washington. 
Like Eisenhower, Washington had first championed the nation through war as a military 
49 "Fortune's Favorite Son" The Journal of Commerce (November 7, 1996), p. 8A. 
so Robert J. Bresler, "Labor and the future of the Democratic Party; labor unions may provide greater
influence on political issues as economic issues replace cultural issues during elections" USA Today 
Magazine 126 (January, 1998), p. 25. 
leader. After the war public sentiment and adoration stayed with Washington, but, as with 
Eisenhower, gradually turned its focus from military to political. Though distinctly 
uncharismatic in terms of qualities such as self-confidence, speech and writing, 
Washington nonetheless captured the admiration of the American people to a degree 
matched by few, if any, presidents to follow him.51
Washington and Eisenhower are merely two more obvious examples of the 
presence of heroic leadership on the American political landscape. Bruce Miroff (1993) 
details four types of leadership that encompass the range of leadership possibilities within 
the American political context. These types include aristocratic leadership as presented 
by Adams and Hamilton, democratic leadership typified by Lincoln and FDR, the 
dissenting leadership of Martin Luther King and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and the heroic 
leadership of men such as JFK and Theodore Roosevelt. 52
Miroff, however, does not present heroic leadership in the glowing, messianic 
terms that scholars have used to describe presidencies of Washington and Eisenhower. 
Rather, he believes that at its best "heroic leadership brings color and charm to American 
politics", while at the same time the ego of the heroic leader "is magnified, leaving 
democratic commitments secondary and opportunistic."53 Miroff categorizes the true
heroic leader as obsessed with image making, and as harboring feelings of superiority at 
guiding a public of lesser capacities and instincts. 54
If these sentiments are true, then the idea of the heroic leader suddenly becomes 
much less appealing in the realm of the American presidency. The American presidents 
51 Barry Schwartz, "George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership" American
Sociological Review 48 (February, 1983), pp. 19-20. 
52 Bruce Miroff, Icons of Democracy (New York, 1993), pp. 352-356.
Sl Miroff, pp. 354-355.
who were also heroic leaders seem much less worthy of respect and honor by the 
American public in light of the negative qualities surrounding heroic leadership. The 
issue of the heroic leader becomes even more confusing considering JF� "Teddy" 
Roosevelt, Washington, and Eisenhower are joined, by varying degrees, in the circle of 
heroic leadership by many other presidents. 
Should Americans hunger after or fear the coming of the heroic leader as 
president? Some scholars believe this point moot as America may be entering into an age 
where heroism is not viewed as an important factor in American politics. Rather, the 
sometimes too public world of politics at the end of the millenium has created an 
environment where an intense scrutiny into the private lives ofleaders renders difficult 
the creation a mystique that traditionally surrounded heroic leaders. This change, 
however, is not necessarily bad, as Americans have increasingly expressed their desire 
for an honest and flexible leader, not an immortal supennan.55
Whether the American voter desires them or not, heroes may have already been 
rendered extinct by the rapidly changing postindustrial world, as it becomes increasingly 
difficult for a leader to "stand" for something in a world that is changing so rapidly.56
FDR and Churchill are the closest that modem political figures come to the patriot-hero, 
however, their partisan political association denies them access to the highest levels of 
patriot sainthood.57 This dearth of heroes raises the possibility that people no longer feel
54 Miroff, p. 354.
55 Walter Truett Anderson, "Have We Outgrown the Age of Heroes" Utne Reader (May/June, 1993), pp.
95-97.
56 Peter Karsten, Patriot-Heroes in England and America: Political Symbolism and Changing Values over
Three Centuries (Wisconsin, 1978), p. 164. 
57 Karsten, p. 164. 
the need for a patriot-hero. Though people still have heroes, the heroes may be athletes, 
activists, or celebrities. 58
Since the decline of the patriot-hero seems a real possibility, what are the 
implications for future presidents? The factor that would be directly affected by the 
declining need for heroes is that of the war hero president. Though the first five war hero 
presidents to seek re-election had been successful, the six and most recent, George Bush, 
failed in his bid during the election of 1992. Interestingly enough, the next presidential 
election saw another war hero, Bob Dole, lose his attempt to the White House. Both Bush 
and Dole also lost to Bill Clinton, a candidate with no military experience and long 
standing questions regarding drug experimentation and extramarital affairs. While these 
losses do not constitute enough evidence to discount the probability of future war heroes 
gaining presidential election and re-election, they do raise issues as to the continuing 
strength of the war hero factor as the twenty-first century approaches. 
Possibly of more significance to the importance of the war hero factor than the 
losses by Bush and Dole to Clinton concerns the possibility of continued peace. Except 
for Vietnam the United States has not been involved in a major war since Korea. As the 
window to run for president closes around the last of the World War Two and Korean 
War veterans, the factor of war hero president may lose a large deal of potency. The 
unpopular Vietnam War does not tug at emotional heartstrings to the degree that World 
War Two and other conflicts have done; therefore future candidates with war experience 
in Vietnam might not receive the same degree of patriotic sentiment that has aided past 
presidents. Perhaps even more damning, the war hero factor might become obsolete if the 
United States continues to remain at peace. After the Vietnam War, the only conflict that 
58 Anderson, p. 99. 
may produce a war hero president is the Gulf War, a marginal war against an outmatched 
foe, fought to preserve cheap oil. 
Given the weakening of public adoration for political heroes, coupled with the 
lack of conflict that grows with the duration of peace, the factor of war hero status on 
incumbency might become obsolete, like the founding father factor. A more likely 
scenario presents the United States entering into a war sometime in the future and the 
eventual re-appearance of war hero candidates the magnitude of Grant and Eisenhower. 
However, this occurrence would be far enough in the future that to predict the dynamics 
of the American public and the political environment would be an exercise in wasted 
time. 
While the future influence of the war hero factor on presidential re-election 
remains unclear, the importance of economic prosperity to incumbent presidents is much 
easier to predict. A sound economy serves as the ideal panacea to the incumbent 
president. Though an opponent may always raise questions about the fiscal success of the 
current president, the gut feeling of the voting public will be the true measure of the state 
of the economy. Economic issues have raised and toppled governments worldwide 
throughout the history of recorded events, and the future will not change the enonnous 
degree of influence that money and economics play in the political arena. Future 
presidents who keep the United States in sound financial he&th will experience greatly 
improved odds in gaining a second term. A logical correlation also exists between the 
economy and re-election, the better the economy of the United States, the more influence 
this factor will have in ensuring successful incumbents. 
The state of the American economy has seived and will continue to seive as an 
excellent predictor of presidential re-election. The economic prosperity factor, however, 
is surpassed in prediction strength by the presence of a war or foreign conflict during a 
presidential election guaranteeing incumbent victory. A United States presidential 
incumbent has never lost an election during a time of war, and the strength of the ongoing 
war factor indicates that such an event would be unlikely. Sociological theory and 
historical trends have been presented supporting the idea that people dislike internal 
change during times of external crisis. If a leader is known and established during a time 
of war, the citizens of the country will not opt for a leadership change, primarily in fear 
that the situation will worsen. This fear of change during crisis acts as the primary factor 
in re-electing incumbents during times of war. 
Of the three factors into which successful presidential incumbents can be 
categorized (the founding father/ patriot factor notwithstanding), the presence of a war 
during re-election will act as the best predictor of re-election success. The second 
strongest factor is the state of the United States economy, which if favorable will have a 
strong positive correlation to re-election success for incumbents. The final factor in 
determining re-election success relates to the status of the incumbent as a war hero. For 
this measure, the greater the magnitude of the war hero, the greater the chance of re­
election success. These factors may be applied to any future presidential elections in 
which an incumbent is facing a challenger in order to gain an insight on the probability of 
re-election success for the incumbent. 
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